The "low risk anomaly" refers to the empirical pattern that apparently high-risk equities do not earn commensurately high returns. In this paper, we consider the possibility that the risk anomaly represents mispricing, not a misspecification of risk, and develop the implications for corporate capital structure. The risk anomaly generates a simple tradeoff model: Starting at zero leverage, the overall cost of capital initially falls as leverage increases equity risk. As debt becomes risky, however, the marginal benefit of increasing equity risk declines. The optimum is reached at lower leverage for firms with high asset risk. Consistent with a risk anomaly tradeoff, firms with low-risk assets choose higher leverage. In addition, leverage is inversely related to systematic risk, holding constant total risk; a large number of firms maintain small or zero leverage despite high marginal tax rates; and many others maintain high leverage despite little tax benefit.
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I. Introduction
According to traditional capital structure theory, adding leverage increases the risk and cost of equity but, in the absence of other frictions, does not change the overall weighted average cost of capital. As long as equity and debt markets are integrated, and therefore price risk the same way, the precise division of risk between equity and debt is irrelevant.
Empirical research in asset pricing has called into question how the stock market, in particular, prices risk and return. For example, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) predicts that the expected return on a security is proportional to its systematic risk (beta). The "low risk anomaly" is the empirical pattern that stocks with higher beta or volatility have tended to earn lower returns, not higher returns, both on a risk-adjusted basis and sometimes even on an unadjusted basis. Put simply, the fundamental risk-return relationship in the stock market has historically been flat, if not inverted. This result was originally documented in the 1970s and was
given new emphasis by results in, for example, Fama and French (1992) , Ang, Hodrick, Ying, and Zhang (2006) , and Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2011) . There is now a burgeoning empirical and theoretical literature on this anomaly, and a number of these papers consider the findings to be evidence of mispricing, rather than a misspecification of risk.
In the spirit of Stein (1996) , who considers rational capital budgeting in the presence of capital market mispricing, we study how capital structure should be set in the presence of a low risk anomaly. The basic idea is that firms with low risk assets -and hence underpriced equitymay want to rely disproportionately on debt. We develop and test this idea in three steps. The first is to measure the low risk anomaly in equity and corporate debt returns. The second step is to model optimal leverage in the presence of the low risk anomaly. The third step is to examine the model's main prediction of a link between leverage and systematic asset risk.
We measure the low risk anomaly in a large sample of CRSP returns data. Consistent with prior results, a one-unit increase in equity beta is associated with lower beta-adjusted stock returns -that is, lower realized cost of equity -of around 5% per year, which we use in subsequent calibrations. Because capital structure irrelevance depends on market integration, not a rational tradeoff between risk and return, we also confirm that the anomaly, at least in an integrated fashion, does not extend to debt markets. We do not expect this paper -or any otherto resolve the age-old question of whether these facts represent mispricing and market segmentation. Rather, we believe the evidence is sufficient to consider the possibility.
Our model of optimal capital structure, the main contribution of the paper, illustrates a simple tradeoff. It assumes no frictions other than a low risk anomaly in equity. This contrasts with traditional tradeoff theories, which generate an interior optimum by assuming one friction to limit leverage on the high side and another to limit it on the low side.
The intuition of the risk anomaly tradeoff is as follows. Under the anomaly, risk is overvalued in equity securities, but not in debt securities. Ideally, then, to minimize the cost of capital, risk is concentrated in equity. A firm will always want to issue as much riskless debt as it can. This lowers the cost of equity by increasing its risk without any "inefficient" transfer of risk from equity to debt. But, as debt becomes risky, further increases in leverage have a cost.
Shifting overvalued risk in equity securities to fairly valued risk, or simply less overvalued risk, in debt increases the cost of capital. For firms with high-risk assets, this cost is high even at low levels of leverage. For firms with very low risk assets, this cost remains low until leverage is high.
The main prediction of the model is that leverage should be inversely related to asset beta. Calibrations using the magnitude of the anomaly suggest that the value gains from exploiting the tradeoff appropriately-or losses from failing to do so-can be substantial.
We find strong empirical support for this prediction. In a large CRSP-Compustat sample, the inclusion of asset risk variables can more double the explanatory power of standard leverage regressions that include profitability, asset tangibility, market-to-book assets, size, and marginal tax rates. The results are robust to alternative measures of asset beta, such as industry asset beta or equity beta only, and leverage, such as market values or net leverage.
The risk anomaly tradeoff may help to explain features of the data that are not compatible with the traditional theory, which involves a tradeoff of tax benefits and bankruptcy costs. In particular, Graham (2000) and others have pointed out that hundreds of profitable firms, with high marginal tax rates, maintain literally zero leverage, creating a low-leverage puzzle. A number of profitable firms also maintain quite high leverage despite no tax benefit. Given our finding that low leverage firms tend to have high asset beta, and vice-versa, these facts are consistent with the risk anomaly tradeoff. For example, if low leverage firms find that the tax benefit of debt is less than the opportunity cost of transferring risk to lower-cost equity, low leverage would be optimal even in the presence of such (realistic) additional frictions.
While we do not argue that the forces behind standard tradeoff models are unrealistic, we also argue that increasingly complex variants of the standard theory also have trouble explaining the data. For example, optimal leverage may depend inversely on systematic risk because higher asset beta, all else equal, reflects the market state and increases in the present value of the costs of financial distress when distress is likelier to occur. Almeida and Philippon (2007) make this general argument, while Shleifer and Vishny (1992) suggest clustered asset fire sales as a mechanism. But, we argue that the traditional tradeoff theory, with rational asset pricing, cannot explain both the notion that systematic risk measured by beta increases the present value of the costs of financial distress and the asset pricing evidence that systematic risk measured by beta is not priced. The risk anomaly tradeoff neatly accommodates both facts.
An intriguing incidental finding is that the standard regressors tend to have the opposite correlation with asset beta as they do with leverage. For example, high market-to-book is associated with low leverage as well as high risk. A topic for future research is the extent to which variables like market-to-book are proxying for investment opportunities and the costs of debt overhang, as traditionally argued, or whether part of its explanatory power, and that of some of the other standard variables, derives from an indirect link to mispriced risk that is imperfectly proxied by our estimates of beta.
The paper proceeds in the order mentioned above. Section II reviews the literature on the low risk anomaly, measures it in our data, and investigates the extent to which it is shared in the debt market. Section III presents a model of optimal capital structure under the low risk anomaly.
Section IV tests its predictions and discusses alternative explanations. Section V concludes.
II. The Low Risk Anomaly
In this section we give some background on the anomaly and then estimate its size in our own data. Based on a broad view of the evidence, we conclude that the anomaly is a sufficiently robust pattern to justify a study of its normative implications for capital structure.
A. Background
Over the long run, riskier asset classes have earned higher returns in U.S. markets. Small stocks have outperformed large caps, which have outperformed corporate bonds, which have outperformed long-term Treasuries, and so on (Ibbotson Associates (2012)). Our interest, however, is the evidence that the historical risk-return tradeoff within the stock market is flat or inverted. While the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) predicts that the expected return on a security is proportional to its systematic risk (beta), the "low risk anomaly" is the cross-sectional pattern that stocks with higher beta (or higher idiosyncratic risk) have tended to earn lower returns, particularly on a risk-adjusted basis.
The low risk anomaly is present across stock markets and sample periods. Black (1972) , Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) , Haugen and Heins (1975) , and Fama and French (1992) all noted the relatively flat relationship between expected returns and beta risk in the U.S. More recently, Ang, Hodrick, Ying, and Zhang (2006, 2009) have emphasized the magnitude and robustness of the anomaly, including in world markets. Blitz and van Vliet (2007) and Baker, Bradley, and Taliaferro (2013) confirm the presence of the anomaly within developed markets and Blitz, Pang, and van Vliet (2012) extend this to emerging markets. Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) and Barberis and Huang (2008) . Leverage-constrained investors who seek maximum returns from beta risk must invest in high beta stocks directly as opposed to a levered portfolio of low beta stocks (Black (1972) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) ). Moreover, sophisticated investors may have trouble exploiting and eliminating the anomaly. Fund managers may prefer high-beta assets themselves because the inflows to performing well are greater than the outflows to performing poorly (Karceski (2002) ), or because they are rewarded for beating the market, which presumably has a positive risk premium, on a non-beta-adjusted basis (Brennan (1993) and Baker et al. (2011) ). More generally, short-selling constraints inhibit sophisticated investors' ability to exploit an overpricing of high-beta stocks (Hong and Sraer (2012)) .
A relatively open question is the existence or size of a similar anomaly in debt markets.
As we discuss below, this is important for corporate finance implications. The most recent evidence is Houweling, van Vliet, Wang, and Beekhuizen (2014) , who find that short-maturity corporate bonds issued by low risk firms have somewhat higher beta-risk-adjusted returns. A significant difference for our purpose is their betas are with respect to the corporate bond market. Fama and French (1993) report that stock market betas are practically identical for bond portfolios of various ratings and conclude that different risk factors describe returns in the stock and bond markets. Baele, Bekaert, and Inghelbrecht (2009) find that the magnitude and even the sign of the correlation between stock index and government bond returns is highly unstable.
Nonetheless, we are not aware of a more formal test for an integrated low risk anomaly.
The low risk anomaly challenges not just the CAPM, a convenient but not strictly necessary assumption of traditional capital structure theory, but any framework where risk and expected return are positively related. There is a large literature in asset pricing that aims to identify measures of risk that perform better than beta, with the implicit notion that beta is not a meaningful risk to the representative investor. In light of the robust evidence and reasonable explanations, however, this paper follows several others and takes the view that the low risk anomaly reflects inefficient asset pricing, not misspecification of risk.
B. Measuring the Anomaly
We focus on estimating the magnitude of the anomaly as an input to later calibrations.
Along the way we establish that it is primarily an equity market phenomenon. Should there happen to be an identical anomaly across the equity and debt markets, then the cost of capital would vary pathologically with asset risk but in a way that managers could not control with financial structure, so it is important to rule this out.
We use a linear specification for low risk anomaly in equity
and debt
where r f is the risk free rate, r p is the market risk premium,  d is average debt beta, and  . <= 0 measures the size of the anomaly in that market. (with the minor modification that the weighted average of equity and debt betas is one) the cost of capital is simply
which is independent of the chosen capital structure e. Panel B shows the case of a low risk anomaly in equities and correctly priced debt. Here,  <  d = 0. Panel C shows the case of low risk anomalies in both equity and debt with the empirically relevant case of  <  d < 0, although there is no theoretical reason why the anomaly could not be greater in debt.
We first estimate the relationship between equity returns and beta using data from The story since 1931 is similar. The anomaly is not immediately apparent in raw returns, although even after 81 years there is no statistically significant difference between the return on high and low risk portfolios. The risk-adjusted returns again reveal the anomaly. The weakest but still significant anomaly is found in equal-weighted returns with CAPM betas. As before, there is a stronger anomaly with respect to the Fama-French models. The greater underperformance appears to come from netting out the more prominent small cap (SMB) and value (HML) effects in the high beta portfolio.
We next look for a debt market anomaly. We compute an alpha and beta for long-term corporate and government bonds using data from Ibbotson Associates. We report these in Table   3 and plot them alongside the equity portfolios in Figure 2 . There are two immediate observations from the figure. First, the corporate bond data points fall below the extended security market line computed from the equity market in both samples. Second, while the corporate bond returns still fall above the theoretical security market line, this appears to be entirely due to a term premium in both government and corporate bonds. A portion of the return on corporate bonds during this period reflects falling inflation, not an integrated low risk anomaly. With this in mind, we also control for the term premium on government bonds in the second panel. Baker and Wurgler (2013) find that there is a statistically strong link between bond returns and the cross-section of stock returns. The low risk stock portfolio is exposed to government bond returns to a much greater degree than the high risk stock portfolio. This turns out to explain only a small portion of the low risk anomaly in stocks, however. By contrast, exposure to government bond returns explains the entire alpha on corporate bonds. The alpha on corporate bonds is now 11.3 basis points lower than the low risk stock portfolio, while it 'should be' 23.5 basis points higher. The gap of 34.8 basis points is highly statistically significant.
Over the full history, when the performance of government bonds was more modest, we reject integration equally or more strongly. In short, while there is a link between government bonds and low risk stocks, there is otherwise little evidence of a common low risk anomaly across debt and equity markets. This means reducing the risk of corporate equity by substituting equity for corporate bonds would not have left the overall cost of capital unchanged. In terms of Figure 1 , the data are most consistent with Panel B or perhaps Panel C with a modest low risk anomaly in debt markets. As these two cases have qualitatively similar conclusions for optimal capital structure, we will assume that debt is correctly priced in the theoretical work.
III. The Low Risk Anomaly and Capital Structure
This section starts with a model of optimal capital structure with no frictions other than a low risk anomaly in equity. There are no taxes, transaction costs, issuance costs, incentive or information effects of leverage, or costs of financial distress or bankruptcy. Unlike other tradeoff models, which require one tradeoff to limit leverage on the low side and another to limit it on the high side, this single mechanism drives an interior optimum. The central prediction we are working toward is that firms with high asset beta will prefer low leverage, since the natural benefit they acquire from the low beta anomaly deteriorates quickly with leverage, while low beta firms will maintain high leverage in order to better capture it.
At the end of the section, we discuss this prediction in more detail in anticipation of the empirical work. We hypothesize that the risk anomaly mechanism may contribute explanatory power to the cross-section of leverage both within the normal range and in the extremes, where the basic tradeoff model plainly fails: the hundreds of firms that maintain almost no debt despite clear tax benefits and ability to pay and a number of others that maintain quite high debt despite low or zero marginal tax rates.
A. A Low Risk Anomaly Tradeoff Theory
The main assumption is the existence of a linear anomaly in equity and no anomaly in debt, roughly consistent with our previous empirical results. This is the case of Panel B in Figure   1 , corresponding to  <  d = 0 in terms of Equations (1) and (2). A less important assumption is that the CAPM holds up to the low risk anomaly in equity. Any model where there is a stronger low risk anomaly in equity markets will lead to the same qualitative conclusions. By assuming sufficient conditions for the CAPM to hold in rational markets, we can develop comparative statics using the transfer of beta risk from equity to debt as leverage increases.
When there is a low risk anomaly in equity, so that  is nonzero, the weighted average cost of capital depends not only on asset beta but on leverage:
where e is the ratio of equity to total assets and debt beta, without any further loss of generality, is a function of leverage and the underlying asset risk. The second to last term (the asset beta times ) is the uncontrollable reduction (increase) in the cost of capital that comes from having high-risk (low-risk) assets. The last term is the controllable cost of having too little leverage that arises only when equities contain a non-zero low risk anomaly.
The optimal capital structure minimizes this last term, by satisfying the first order condition for e. With the further assumption of a differentiable debt beta, the optimal capital ratio e* satisfies:
Interestingly, the optimum leverage does not depend on the size of the low risk anomaly. This is somewhat of a technicality, however. If there were other frictions associated with leverage, such as taxes or costs of financial distress, then the existence as well as the size of the anomaly would be relevant.
Observation 1: A firm will issue as much risk-free debt as possible and at least a bit of risky debt. The first order condition cannot be satisfied as long as the debt beta is zero. At a zero debt beta, the left side of Equation (4) is positive. In other words, issuing more equity at the margin will raise the cost of capital.
At first blush, this would seem to deepen the low leverage puzzle. One might ask why nonfinancial firms do not increase their leverage ratios further to take advantage of the low risk anomaly: It is initially unclear how the low leverage ratios of nonfinancial firms represent an optimal tradeoff between the tax benefits of interest and the costs of financial distress, much less an extra benefit of debt arising from the mispricing of low risk stocks.
The answer contained in Equation (4) is that many low leverage firms-e.g. the stereotypical unprofitable technology firm-start with a high asset beta or overall asset risk, so their assets are already quite risky at zero debt. Even at modest levels of debt, meaningful amounts of risk are transferred from equity to debt.
The problem of minimizing the cost of capital will generally have an interior optimum, which can be verified by testing the second order condition. The first derivative of the debt beta with respect to capital e is negative. While there is no tidy, general formula for the debt beta, any reasonable model features a debt beta that is increasing in leverage. The second derivative of the debt beta with respect to capital is also positive, and the intuition is not much more subtle. The marginal reduction in the debt beta per unit increase in e is falling as e rises; the debt beta is convex in e. This must also be true with some generality, because the debt beta cannot fall below zero. A negative first derivative and a positive second derivative makes the second order condition positive and any solution to Equation (4) a minimum.
We can then sign the change in optimal leverage as a function of the underlying asset beta. Taking the derivative of e* with respect to the asset beta yields:
This expression is shown to be positive as follows. The first term in braces is simply the second order condition, which we just determined is positive. The second term in braces is in general negative. All else equal, debt betas are increasing in asset betas, so the first term within is negative. For the second also to be negative, the sensitivity of the debt beta to the asset beta must fall as capital rises. As the firm gets better capitalized, the asset risk no longer matters as much.
We know that at the limit, asset risk does not matter at all, so this also seems general. This means the sign of Equation (5) is positive, and that optimal capital is increasing in asset betas. High asset beta firms carry less debt, when subjected to a low risk anomaly, than do low asset beta firms, restated as Observation 2.
Observation 2: The optimal leverage ratio is decreasing in asset beta. There is a simple intuition. Risk is overvalued in equity securities and fairly valued in debt securities.
Ideally, to minimize the cost of capital, risk is concentrated in equity. This leads to the first result that firms will issue as much risk-free debt as possible. This lowers the cost of equity by increasing its risk without any inefficient transfer of risk from equity to debt. However, once debt becomes risky, further increases in leverage have a cost. Shifting overvalued risk in equity securities to fairly valued risk in debt increases the cost of capital. For firms with high-risk assets, this increase is high even at low levels of leverage. For firms with very low risk assets, this increase remains low until leverage is high.
Observation 3: The optimal leverage ratio can be reframed as a target level of debt risk. The first order condition in Equation (4) can be rearranged as the choice of a debt beta, consistent with the notion that firms target debt ratings, not leverage ratios per se. As already noted, the derivative of the debt beta is negative, making the optimal debt beta less than one, regardless of asset risk. If the first dollar of debt were to have a beta greater than or equal to one, then a firm would choose zero debt, or possibly hold excess cash, to lower its asset risk and its marginal debt beta. More generally, the target debt beta depends on asset risk: 
Riskier firms target somewhat lower credit ratings. The first term is positive, because equity capital e* is increasing in asset risk and debt betas are decreasing in capital. The second term is weakly positive, because the second derivative and the cross partial derivative are both negative as discussed above and equity capital cannot go below zero. Negative debt is possible, but not negative equity. Taking only the low risk anomaly into account, riskier firms will target lower credit ratings, but this is attenuated by a more conservative leverage choice.
B. Illustrations
To go further than these three directional results, we need to specify the debt beta as a and equity and no costs of financial distress. For each level of leverage, we compute the value of debt, the value of equity, and the equity beta using the Merton model. Figure 3 shows the cost of capital and firm value as a function of leverage for a variety of asset risk levels. In the absence of a low risk anomaly, cash flows both grow and are discounted at the CAPM rate, so firm value is the same at all asset risk levels. In the Figure we modify the value of equity using the low risk anomaly in Equation (1) with an anomaly of = 5% per year, roughly the observed value.
The figure shows how an equity beta greater than one makes use of the anomaly and raises value. An equity beta less than one reduces value, and then some, in passing it up. Because the only effects here are through the weighted average cost of capital, with no cash flow effects, a weighted average cost of capital minimum in Panel A is equivalent to a firm value maximum in Panel B. Finally, under a low risk anomaly, high asset risk means higher valuations at any level of leverage, Panel C removes this effect and shows value levels relative to the maximum for each level of asset risk. This panel shows that at least under these calibration parameters, failing to exploit the low risk anomaly can lead to large losses in firm value.
C. Predictions
These figures illustrate the effects of a low risk anomaly on capital structure choice and the main testable prediction: All else equal, leverage should be set inversely to asset beta.
We restate the mechanism here. It is easiest to see in terms of extreme cases. First, low leverage firms that start with a high asset beta have only modest incentives to issue debt. Their high-risk equity is already highly valued. Although there may be a small additional amount of value to a bit of debt (the value maximum is not quite at zero leverage), even a small exogenous cost of accessing the debt markets might lead a firm to zero debt. Or, if managers of unlevered firms follow a simpler rule of thumb, only executing a leveraged recapitalization, substituting equity for debt, when equity is undervalued by the CAPM, they may also choose zero debt.
This may help to explain some of the low leverage puzzle broached by Miller (1977) and documented clearly by Graham (2000) . As an example, Linear Technology Corporation (Nasdaq: LLTC) produces semiconductors with a market capitalization of $7.7 billion as of December 2012. Despite profitable operations, a pre-interest marginal tax rate of 35% by the methodology in Graham and Mills (2008) , and a cash balance of $1 billion, Linear maintains negative net debt. One explanation for this may be its high asset beta.
While rarer than inexplicably low-leverage firms, a number of profitable firms maintain high leverage despite little tax benefit. An example here is Textainer (NYSE: TGH), a firm that leases and trades marine cargo containers. As of the end of 2012, its market capitalization was approximately $1.7 billion. It has tangible assets of $3.4 billion, a cash balance of $175 million.
Despite a marginal tax rate close to 0%, as a result of front-loaded depreciation, modest growth, and an off-shore tax status, it maintains $2.7 billion in debt. A potential explanation for this failure of the standard tradeoff theory is the firm's low asset beta. Equity is undervalued at low leverage, and its value rises steadily, to its correct valuation and beyond, as leverage increases.
This discussion is also pertinent to a special set of uniquely high leverage firms, banks, which are often excluded from capital structure analyses. As Figure 3 shows, a low risk anomaly in equities means that regulating low asset beta firms, in the sense of requiring them to de-lever significantly, can impose large losses in private value and increases in the cost of capital. As an example, Baker and Wurgler (2015) find that banks' asset betas are on the order of 0.10, and that the low risk anomaly within banks is at least as large as what we find for all firms. While there are numerous other forces at play in regulatory debates, the loss of the low risk anomaly's benefits provides one foundation for bankers' common argument that reducing leverage would increase their cost of capital (e.g., Elliott (2013)).
Most firms fall somewhere in between leverage extremes. We explore the extent to which the risk anomaly tradeoff, as captured through asset beta, can explain the middle of the crosssection as well as such extreme cases. Those are actually not uncommon, and are particularly interesting here because they are where the standard tradeoff theory is least adequate.
IV. Empirical Tests
We introduce the data and then proceed to the main analysis of the relationship between leverage and risk. We control for the intersection of traditional capital structure explanatory variables found in studies such as Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) , Rajan and Zingales (1995) , Baker and Wurgler (2002) , Frank and Goyal (2009) , and others.
A. Data
Our main variables are introduced in Gross book leverage is long-term debt and notes payable divided by the sum of long-term debt and notes payable plus book equity. Net book leverage nets out cash and equivalents from the numerator and denominator. Gross and net market leverage replace book equity with the market value of common equity from CRSP. The fixed assets ratio, a proxy for the relevance of financial distress costs, is net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Profitability, which would be positively correlated with leverage under the standard tradeoff theory but inversely correlated under the Myers and Majluf (1984) pecking order theory, is EBIT divided by total assets.
Market-to-book assets is known to be negatively related to leverage, consistent with the need for firms with strong growth opportunities to avoid having to pass them up (Myers (1977) ), or perhaps equity market timing (Baker and Wurgler (2002) ). It is gross debt and market equity divided by the sum of gross debt and book equity. Asset growth is somewhat exploratory. It could be a proxy for growth opportunities, or it could capture size or the profitability that helps to make debt-financed acquisitions. Firm size, measured as the natural log of book assets, may also proxy for a variety of influences. Fama and French (1992) use it to represent the greater cash flow volatility of smaller firms and their higher expected costs of financial distress. It will also be correlated with their generally lesser access to debt markets. Finally, John Graham's preinterest marginal tax rates account for many features of the tax code. As shown by Graham and Mills (2008) , they approximate the tax rates simulated with federal tax return data.
The leverage determinants that interest us most are constructed from stock returns. Asset beta is unlevered equity beta, assuming debt is riskless. As we reported earlier, betas on corporate debt are very low, and in any case it is hard to do better without debt returns data.
Total equity risk is the standard deviation of excess stock returns. Asset risk is the unlevered version. Industry asset beta and risk are market equity weighted averages.
B. Summary Statistics and Correlations
Tables 4 and 5 show summary statistics and correlations. With respect to the standard capital structure regression variables, the summary statistics, which show profitable and unprofitable firms separately, contain no surprises. Profitable firms have higher tax rates and are larger. Asset beta is somewhat higher for unprofitable firms, at least for own (firm-specific) asset beta. Total risk is as well. With respect to asset risk, a firm must be promising and at least on a path to profitability to enter the CRSP-Compustat sample for the 24 months that we require to compute beta. Becoming unprofitable may be associated with unexpectedly negative returns; also, firms in variable industries are more likely to find themselves unprofitable in a given period. The latter logic also applies to beta, on the downside.
The correlations in Table 5 contain a few insights, however. One is that gross and net leverage measures are loosely correlated enough to consider both as a robustness exercise. It is less important to consider both book and market leverage measures, given their 0.93 correlation, but we follow tradition and do so. The more interesting correlations are those between our risk measures and standard regression variables. In particular, asset beta risk is negatively correlated with tax rates, fixed assets, profitability, and size, and positively correlated with market-to-book and asset growth. Correlations are not transitive, but we will see, and prior research confirms, that several of these variables then have the opposite sign coefficients in leverage regressions.
We will then need to ask whether the standard variables affect leverage because of an assortment of different theories, or because they are also picking up on a single force, asset beta risk. We return to this when we discuss the regressions. counts as high leverage is subjective. We obviously cannot expect a spike at the 100%-insolvency. For simplicity, we choose a cutoff of 50%. The columns then add an additional sort into low (MTR<5%), medium, and high (MTR>30%) marginal tax rate groups.
The low leverage puzzle is represented in the large number of firm-months with positive profitability, high marginal tax rates, and very low leverage. In fact, these make up 80% of all profitable, low leverage firms (=122,003/(7,236+23,936+122,003)). Firms like Linear
Technology are in this bin. Conversely, there are a reasonable number of firm-months where, despite almost no tax benefit, leverage exceeds 50%. These make up somewhat over 4% of all profitable high-leverage firms (=8,407/(8,407+34,436+162,315)) and include firms like Textainer.
Some initial support for the risk anomaly tradeoff, on the other hand, comes from the strong difference in asset market risks across the leverage levels, which is also essentially independent of tax rates. Within the middle tax rate group, for example, asset betas decline sharply with leverage. Firms with very low leverage have a median asset beta of 1.57. This falls to 0.92 for medium leverage firms and all the way to 0.49 for high leverage firms. Also consistent with the risk anomaly tradeoff is the steady decline in asset risk. This, however, is somewhat less specific to the theory, as it could in principle just be another control for financial distress costs. We will, therefore, be more interested in the effect of asset beta controlling for total asset risk, among other influences, in regressions.
C. Regressions: Standard Determinants
The first column of Table 8 shows a baseline capital structure regression. We report marginal effects of Tobit regressions that cluster on both firm and month to improve standard errors. We choose gross book leverage for this baseline and include the typical empirical covariates. The pattern of coefficients, as well as the poor overall R 2 , match prior results. The weak regression coefficient on the tax rate variable is typical. The next several variables' signs and effects are also consistent with prior research. Fixed assets has a fairly strong positive coefficient, profitability a negative coefficient, market-to-book a negative coefficient, and size a positive coefficient. Rajan and Zingales (1995) focus on these four variables and obtain the same results. Finally, asset growth has a positive coefficient, rather inconsistent with it proxying for growth opportunities and more so with the interpretation that asset growth is more a consequence of the ability and desire to finance with debt, determined by other underlying sources, as opposed to being a determinant of leverage in its own right.
Note that each of these variables is typically given a somewhat different interpretation.
One is used to proxy for one effect; another for another. Yet comparing the pattern of signs in this regression with the pattern of correlation signs suggests an intriguing hypothesis: the standard may also be "working" because they capture the single force of asset beta. We hypothesize that asset beta is negatively related to leverage. And each of these variables, with the exceptions of profitability and asset growth (where the theory is weaker, as well as the correlation with asset beta, at between 0.03 and 0.07), has a regression coefficient that is the opposite sign to its correlation with asset beta. It is hard to know exactly what these variables capture, but it is an appealing idea that a common mechanism may, in part, contribute to their explanatory power.
The reason it is so difficult to explain the cross-section of capital structure, even with a set of variables curated over decades, is apparent in Figure 5 . The yellow bars in Panel A show the distribution of actual book leverage ratios for profitable firms with very low and high marginal tax rates. The low-leverage puzzle constituents are those in the spike at the left extreme of the high tax rate distribution. The firms with high leverage are those in the spike at the right extreme of the low tax rate distribution-keeping in mind that the spike is artificial because we are censoring the data at 50% leverage. Except for the mode at 1% leverage or less, the distribution of (book) leverage declines only gradually until we reach the extremely high levels of leverage where banks tend to reside. Finally, given that the leverage distributions for low-and high-tax firms are the same, the weak coefficient on tax rates is not surprising.
The white bars in Figure 5 show the distribution of predicted values according to the baseline model. The hump shapes near mean leverage levels, which are about 33% for profitable firms and 30.5% for unprofitable firms (neither figure is conditioned further on tax rates), are indicative of the model's low explanatory power for the broad span of leverage.
D. Regressions: Adding Asset Beta
We now add risk measures to the standard regression determinants. Our special focus is on asset beta, which is exactly what our theory suggests. We also control for overall risk. In principle, any effect of total asset risk could reflect the low risk anomaly tradeoff-some explanations of the low risk anomaly are specific to beta, others are not. However, even though it is not usually included in leverage regressions, total asset risk is also a plausible proxy for the expected costs of financial distress, especially compared to asset beta. Firms care far more about going bankrupt at all than about precisely when it happens.
The results in the remaining columns of Table 7 show that asset beta is a very strong determinant of leverage, consistent with the main prediction. This is true controlling for overall asset risk (as well as in a univariate regression). In fact, a simple regression including these two asset risk variables has almost double the explanatory power than the baseline regression with six regressors. Adding the control variables does not significantly affect the coefficient or t-statistic on asset beta. In terms of magnitude, a one unit increase in asset beta reduces leverage of profitable firms by 6.4%. The economic effect of total asset risk is larger, though its interpretation is unfortunately cloudy, while the economic effects of the other determinants are lower in all cases. The remaining regressions establish robustness through a number of alternative specifications. The key issue in these regressions is the mechanical link between the leverage ratio used to unlever the equity betas and volatilities to form independent variables and the dependent variable. Our first approach is to substitute firm-level estimates of risk with industry measures in the rest of Table 7 . The economic effects are almost identical.
In Table 8 , we consider a wider range of leverage measures, netting out cash and substituting book value with market value equity. The effects of beta on leverage are slightly larger when we go from book to market and when we go from gross to net leverage. This also spreads the distribution of predicted leverage ratios in Figure 6 further, relative to the market leverage baseline, picking up more of the low leverage cases.
In the final table, we remove the mechanical link between beta and leverage entirely by replacing asset beta and asset risk with an equity beta and equity volatility. Note that this creates a potential reverse causality that goes in the opposite direction from the predicted direction.
Leverage, if chosen randomly, should be associated with higher equity betas and volatilities.
However, if firms with higher asset risk choose lower leverage and firms with lower asset risk choose higher leverage in a way that does not fully equilibrate the betas, as the model predicts, then there will be on net a negative relationship between beta and leverage. This is what we find in Table 9 .
E. Regarding Alternative Explanations
Suppose we take the empirical fact to be truth: Higher asset beta is associated with lower leverage. This is consistent with the risk anomaly tradeoff in leverage. The cost of equity for high beta assets is lower and so less debt is used at the optimum. But, the fact is also consistent with other capital structure theories. Most notably, the costs of financial distress depend not only on the unconditional probability of default and the unconditional value lost in default but also when distress occurs and value is lost. If asset beta, holding all else constant, dictates the market state when distress is likely to occur, then the present value of the costs of financial distress are higher for assets with higher systematic risk. Almeida and Philippon (2007) argue that riskadjustment increases the cost of financial distress.
In the lingo of asset pricing, it is the covariance of the stochastic discount factor with the costs of financial distress that determine the present value of distress costs. If these are higher for some firms at a given level of leverage, they might optimally choose to have less debt (though it is still hard to justify zero debt in the presence of large tax benefits).
Another alternative explanation involves refinancing risk and fire sales, as in Shleifer and Vishny (1992) . If refinancing risk and fire sales discounts are higher during market downturns, this would increase the dollar value lost in distress and again lower the optimal leverage for firms with higher levels of systematic risk.
The forces of a traditional tradeoff between costs of financial distress and tax and other benefits undoubtedly play an important role in leverage choice, at least for some firms. However, it is hard for the traditional tradeoff theory, combined with rational asset pricing, to fit both the leverage and asset pricing evidence on the pricing of beta. If beta is truly a measure of risk, then it would help to explain the cross section of asset returns, which it does not. Investors, recognizing the investment opportunities, would demand higher returns on assets exposed to periods of fire sales. If beta is not truly a measure of risk-as the literature that follows French (1992, 1993) has claimed-then asset beta should not be a constraint on leverage, after controlling for total asset risk. In contrast, the risk anomaly tradeoff of leverage can naturally accommodate both the facts in Tables 1 and 2 as well as those in Tables 7 through 9 .
V. Conclusion
Since Modigliani and Miller, the academic literatures on asset pricing and corporate finance have grown separately. In particular, the corporate finance literature has largely taken the pricing of risk as given, because the overall cost of capital, and hence optimal capital structure, is unaffected under the seemingly plausible assumption that markets for different forms of securities are integrated.
Meanwhile, evidence in asset pricing suggests a low risk anomaly where high-risk equities do not earn commensurately high returns. This paper considers the possibility that this evidence reflects mispricing, driven by a mixture of behavioral and institutional frictions. We use this starting point to develop a tradeoff theory of capital structure. For firms with relatively risky assets, the cost of capital is minimized at a low level of leverage. For firms with very low risk assets, low leverage entails a substantial cost in the form of issuing undervalued equity, and hence the cost of capital is minimized at much higher levels of leverage. Consistent with a risk anomaly, leverage is inversely related to systematic risk and helps resolve both low and high leverage puzzles. More generally, the model parsimoniously accommodates both corporate finance and asset pricing evidence, renewing a fruitful connection between asset pricing and corporate finance research. Plots of average returns and CAPM betas for three equity portfolios sorted into quintiles using pre-ranking betas as well as long-term corporate and government bonds from Ibbotson and Associates. The returns and betas are estimated as in Tables 1 and 2 . An empirical security market line is fit through the three equity data points.
Panel A. 1968 A. Panel B. 1931 Figure 3. Value Effects of Leverage When There is a Low Risk Anomaly in Equities. We compute firm value for firms with five different levels of asset beta. Each firm has a normally distributed terminal value five years hence, with a contractual distribution of value between debt and equity and no costs of financial distress or tax effects. The value of each firm would be exactly $10, regardless of leverage, if there were no low-risk anomaly. Volatility is equal to asset beta times the sum of a market volatility of 16% plus an idiosyncratic firm volatility of 20%. The risk free rate is 2%. We compute the value of equity, the value of debt, and the equity beta under the Merton model with no low risk anomaly. We compound this equity value using the CAPM expected return with a market risk premium of 8% over five years, and then present value this future equity value using the discount rate from Equation (1) with a  of 5%. This is the adjusted equity value. The weighted average cost of capital uses the adjusted equity value and the value of debt as weights, the cost of equity from Equation (1), and the CAPM expected return for debt. Firm value is the adjusted equity value plus the value of debt. Leverage is computed using these market values. Histograms of actual and predicted gross leverage ratios for profitable firms. A firm is defined as profitable if it has earnings before interest and taxes (Compustat = EBITDA) greater than zero. The sample is further divided according to marginal tax rate into firms with a pre-interest marginal tax rate less than 5% and greater than 30%. The marginal tax rate is from John Graham, computed using the methodology of Graham and Mills (2008) . Gross leverage ratio is defined in Panel A as long-term debt (DLTT) plus notes payable (NP) divided by long-term debt plus notes payable plus book equity. Book equity is computed in the same way as in Ken French's data library. Panel B replaces book equity with market capitalization, equal to price times shares outstanding from CRSP. Predicted leverage ratios use the Tobit regression from the first two columns of Table 6 Histograms of actual and predicted gross leverage ratios for profitable firms. A firm is defined as profitable if it has earnings before interest and taxes (Compustat = EBITDA) greater than zero. The sample is further divided according to marginal tax rate into firms with a preinterest marginal tax rate less than 5% and greater than 30%. The marginal tax rate is from John Graham, computed using the methodology of Graham and Mills (2008) . Gross leverage ratio is defined in Panel A as long-term debt (DLTT) plus notes payable (NP) divided by long-term debt plus notes payable plus book equity. Book equity is computed in the same way as in Ken French's data library. Panel B replaces book equity with market capitalization, equal to price times shares outstanding from CRSP. Predicted leverage ratios use the Tobit regression from the third two columns of Table 6 Table 3 . Debt and Equity Market Segmentation. Regressions of portfolio returns on market excess returns and government bond excess returns. Each portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate is computed using value weights. The sample is divided within each month into low (bottom 30%), medium (middle 40%), and high (top 30%) portfolios according to pre-ranking beta, using all CRSP stocks. We also compute the returns to corporate bonds in excess of the riskless rate using data from Ibbotson and Associates. Below we show the market beta, government bond beta, and the alpha (or intercept) for the Bottom 30% portfolio in absolute terms and for the Top 30% portfolio and corporate bonds in relation to the Bottom 30%. The final column compares the extrapolated alpha using the relationship between alpha and beta in the Bottom and Top 30% portfolios to the actual alpha for corporate bonds. In an integrated market, where the low beta anomaly holds equally in stock and bond markets, the actual and extrapolated betas are the same. There are 540 months in the first two panels and 984 in the second two panels. 
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